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More Energy for European Climate Diplomacy

by Dennis Taenzler, adelphi

At the end of June, the EU Foreign Affairs Council adopted a [set of conclusions on EU climate diplomacy](#) that left us with mixed feelings. Acknowledging and recalling that climate change is of paramount importance is commonplace – too often quoted and very seldom followed by decisive action. The explicit reference to the positive results of the [Durban and Doha climate conferences](#) is even a reason to get nervous. Many negotiators and observers will doubt a similarly enthusiastic framing for the most recent results.

And yet, the overall picture also leaves room for some expectation and even hope that – at the European level – new energy will be generated to provide leadership for a comprehensive climate diplomacy needed at different levels. Following the ideas published in the [Joint Reflection paper by the External Action Service in 2011](#), there are three storylines of climate diplomacy that are to shape the overall narrative of EU climate policy.

First, with the June Conclusions, Member States, the Commission and the High Representative reached a consensus that a more strategic approach is needed to ensure a comprehensive global agreement including all major emitters. To consider and accept complementary roles and competences for European

players in building alliances for ambitious climate action in the run-up to 2015 can help to avoid a prolonged political stalemate. In the Reflection Paper,

developed in parallel to the EU Council Conclusions, this is referred to as a „coalition of ambition“ with third countries. With recent domestic efforts in some of the emerging economies like China, such coalitions are more realistic today than some years ago.

Second, to support low-emission and climate resilient development, the EU needs to strengthen its communication of the benefits – climate-related or general – that partnerships with the EU and its member countries can yield. To this end,



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however, a clear commitment to key climate policy instruments is needed to back any communication strategy. The vote by the European Parliament in early July to approve an emission trading reform process is an important step in this direction. By [postponing the auction of 900 million allowances in the ETS](#), the EU sent a clear signal that it is still determined to address some of the shortcomings of its current low carbon approach – even if it remains to be seen if the reform package agreed will yield the intended results.

Third, the Council reaffirms its leadership in addressing the potential security dimensions of climate change. Apart from envisaging dialogue and cooperation with EU partners to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions and switch to greener

paths of energy production, it also recognizes the important role of climate change adaptation, which if designed and implemented in a conflict sensitive way, can form an im-

portant element in the EU climate diplomacy narrative. The task ahead is to outline how the climate diplomacy toolbox will be equipped. Instruments for resource, energy and water security need to prove their relevance for mainstreaming climate diplomacy into the priority agendas of EU member states and their partners.

More energy will be needed during the next months in Brussels and European capitals – not least to help explain the interests and priorities of the EU regarding an ambitious climate approach for 2015 and beyond.

Climate Change: the Water and Food Security Nexus in Africa

by Debay Tadesse, Institute for Security Studies

Future demand for water by farming, including livestock production, will be influenced by strategies for food security, and increasing food supply in Africa is closely linked to the utilization of and access to water. Water shortages are increasingly becoming a serious impediment to intensifying agriculture, with about one-third of the people in the region living in drought-prone areas at present – *as the FAO already stressed in 2008*. In these areas, drought-proofing measures such as soil and water conservation, improved water-harvesting techniques, minimum tillage, improved crop selection and varieties, and small-scale irrigation will be important elements in the region's food security strategies.

Unpredictable rainfall as a result of climate change, lack of water management and failure of crops is making food security impossible in this region. It has been shown that rainfall variability resulting from climate change has decreased crop yields in Africa, affecting agricultural production and resulting in higher prices for food, which could trigger a

“While irrigation seems the obvious measure for improving food security, it has also the additional benefits of being able to provide a basis for growth, income and employment.”

regional food crisis. This would lead to greater food insecurity. Climate change can thus complicate the existing chronic food shortage in Africa in various ways. This includes reducing the potential level of local food production, by putting pressure on global cereals production and by eroding the source of income and asset base of the poor.

A number of countries in Africa, including *Ethiopia*, are characterized as food deficit and are dependent on food aid. This became a major concern for the international community. The recurrence of famine in the 1970s, 80s and 90s has affected the country's food production and currently over 5 million people are dependent on food aid. This is mainly because Ethiopia's agriculture is rainfed and very sensitive



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to climate variability. Insufficient rainfall, for instance, could lead the country into famine. However, it is not just the scarcity of water and fertile land that makes Ethiopia one of the largest recipients of food aid in Africa but also its lack of water management, transfer of technology and financial constraints to developing its agriculture sector. In fact, Ethiopia has “significant agricultural potential” because of its water resources and its fertile land areas. Recognizing this huge potential, the government implemented a strategy to tackle the current food deficit and implemented the “agricultural development led industrialization policy”. This policy is intended to invest resources in local vulnerable households and initiate more capacity building for small farms that have the potential to transform farming from subsistence to “semi-commercial”. The government also allocated 15 percent of the national budget to the agricultural sector. The cost of the programme is nevertheless far beyond the allocated national budget, therefore extensive donor support will be essential.

To date, only about 5 percent of the total potential is utilized. While irrigation seems the obvious measure for improving food security by increasing agricultural productivity, it also has the additional benefits of being able to provide a basis for growth, income and employment. In order to meet the growing demand for food security and nutrition under increasingly difficult climate conditions and in a situation

of diminishing resources, Africa must act urgently toward sustainable and resilient food production systems. The current Food Security and Recovery Project by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to “contribute to the achievement of food security in Africa including disaster risk management and early recovery capacities” should continue.

This article is from our regional partner for Africa, the [Institute for Security Studies \(ISS\)](#). As a leading African human security research institute, ISS works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterized by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security.



Regional Highlights: Asia

China Needs to Change its Energy Strategy in the Mekong Region

by Brian Eyler, IES Kunming Center



Photo by M R / Shutterstock

At the end of this year cars and container trucks loaded with goods from China and Thailand will finally be able to drive across a multi-lane bridge spanning the Mekong River (known as the Lancang in China). The bridge will connect Chiang Rai province in Thailand to Bokeo province in Laos, effectively linking China's highways stretching south from Beijing and Shanghai to those coming north from Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok.

China's regional strategy

"In 2012 China's growth in trade and outward investment with the four other Mekong countries of Myanmar, Laos,

Thailand, and Cambodia surpassed its trade and investment growth in [ASEAN](#) countries," said Xu Ningning, chairman of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Business Council. "Greater growth rates will continue with increases in regional cooperation and win-win investment opportunities."

China's economic cooperation strategies towards its four Mekong neighbours have dovetailed nicely into a strategy that fits China's current development needs. Liu Jinxin, a policy analyst and logistics expert says, "Unlike the US which leads the world in finance and IT, both high-value service-oriented industries, China is the world's factory, producing goods to drive the growth of its growing middle class and serving export markets around the world. To survive, the Chinese 'factory' needs inputs like energy and raw materials."

But is an approach based on geo-economic cooperation a sustainable long term strategy for both China and its Mekong neighbours? The [PetroChina pipeline](#) cutting through Burma serves as a test of the region's commitment to China's geo-economic strategies. Not only does the Myanmar government have the power to choke a strategic energy flow to China, but a Japanese firm holds majority ownership of the Burmese port on the Indian Ocean end of the pipeline. Nationalist sentiments inside China could

accuse the Chinese government of being held hostage not just by Japan but by Myanmar, thus threatening the stability guaranteed by China's geo-economic approach.

China exports 'growth first' model to the Mekong

In many ways China has exported its state-led, growth-at-any-cost development model to the Mekong region. Less developed countries stand to benefit economically from Chinese-backed infrastructure development projects like the US \$7.2 billion high-speed railway from northern Laos to Vientiane and hydropower projects on the main stem of the Mekong in Laos and Cambodia.

However an even distribution of those benefits is unlikely and can only be realized once Laos and Cambodia pay off their colossal debts to China. China's construction of eight hydropower projects on the upper Mekong River in Yunnan province has shown Laos that it can ignore protests from downstream countries about the negative effects of its dams.

This isn't the only environmental risk for China's Mekong neighbours. In China hydropower developers can easily skirt environmental laws and produce misleading environ-

"China should demonstrate rule of law best practices to its Mekong neighbours."

mental impact assessments. Dr Zhou Dequn, a conservation biologist at Kunming's University of Science and Technology argues that these kinds of malpractice have also occurred in Chinese-funded hydropower projects in Laos.

Hydropower threatens food security

Laos plans to develop eleven dams on the mainstream of the Mekong and more than seventy on its tributaries for energy export to China and Thailand. Whilst this will boost its energy resource portfolio, it risks jeopardizing its natural resources, especially fisheries.

Eric Baran from the World Fish Institute claims that the Mekong is the world's largest inland fishery with nearly 10 per-

cent of the world's entire freshwater fish catch. 60 percent of the population of Laos and Cambodia relies on caught fish for 100 percent of their daily protein intake. Mekong dams in Laos could cut off the natural migratory patterns of more than 110 fish species and translate into the loss of up to 800,000 tons of caught fish (42 percent of the Mekong's fish catch) every year, creating a potential food security dilemma in Laos and Cambodia.

Moreover, China's importing of hydropower from Southeast Asia is part of a push to reduce its carbon footprint by investing in renewable energy. However, to replace the loss of protein from Mekong fisheries, Laos and Cambodia will be forced to invest in industrial, carbon intense livestock raising; thus China's carbon footprint will simply have been sent downstream.

State-led strategies stifle sustainable solutions

A major criticism of China's state-led geo-economic strategy is that while it advocates security and interdependence between countries based on deepening economic ties, it fails to promote connections among the complex nexus of stakeholders in both China and the region at large. The exclusion of key stakeholders in policy discussions creates an uneven playing field that not only misallocates resources and leads to inefficiency, but also disenfranchises individuals and institutions who can provide sustainable solutions to regional challenges.

If China wishes to improve its deteriorating reputation in the region it will need to revise its geo-economic strategy. One element of this should be to promote the actions of a wider range of stakeholders. China should also demonstrate rule of law best practices to its Mekong neighbours, particularly when conducting social and environmental impact assessments of infrastructure development projects. Without these changes, China's regional strategies and the sustainability of the Mekong region are at serious risk.

This article originally appeared on ChinaDialogue. Please read the [full-length version](#).

Spring Thaw: What Role Did Climate Change and Natural Resource Scarcity Play in the Arab Spring?

by Schuyler Null and Maria Prebble, Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center

Several high-profile reports in the last few months have suggested that climate change and natural resource scarcity contributed to the events that have rocked the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) since December 2010. Thomas Friedman is [apparently](#) working on a Showtime documentary about the topic. But what exactly was the role of environmental factors in the mass movement?

According to the authors of [The Arab Spring and Climate Change](#), a series of essays edited by Caitlin E. Werrell and Francesco Femia and jointly published by the [Center for American Progress](#), [Stimson Center](#), and [Center for Climate and Security](#), while political uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere were a direct response to oppressive governments and social dissatisfaction, climate change may have acted as a “threat multiplier,” further exacerbating the underlying causes of revolution.

“Global warming may not have caused the Arab Spring, but it may have made it come earlier,” write Sarah Johnstone and [Jeffrey Mazo](#) of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in one essay.

Another report, [Underpinning the MENA Democratic Transition](#), published by [E3G](#), cautions that economic shocks driven by climate change and resource scarcity in the region could challenge fledgling democracies. “Failing to invest in preventive measures now will generate future risks that require additional government capacity to manage,” they write.

“Ag-flation”

“The world is entering a period of ‘ag-flation,’ or inflation driven by rising prices for agricultural commodities,” warn Johnstone and Mazo.



Photo by ChameleonsEye / Shutterstock

Egyptians, for example, depend on bread for one-third of their caloric intake and spend an average of 38 percent of their income on food, writes Troy Sternberg of Oxford University in [The Arab Spring and Climate Change](#), but the country’s arid climate and poor resource management means it cannot produce enough wheat for domestic demand. As a result, Egypt is the world’s largest wheat importer, buying 9.8 million metric tons in 2010.

“Climate change not only contributed to the timing of the Arab Spring, but it may also impede the spread of democracy moving forward.”

In the winter of 2010 and 2011, China – the world’s largest wheat producer – was struck by a “once-in-a-century” drought.

At the same time, wheat production in Russia, Ukraine, and Canada also fell dramatically due to [drought](#), [wildfires](#), and abnormal cold (Canada). With global wheat supplies constricted, the Egyptian government [failed to balance](#) subsidies and market prices with public needs. According to research by Johnstone and Mazo, at the time of the uprisings in early 2011, food prices had increased by 20 percent and 40 million Egyptians – [about half of the population](#) – were receiving food rations.

“We have reached the point where a regional climate event can have a global extent,” writes Sternberg. Nine of the top ten wheat-importing countries per capita in the world are in the Middle East, and seven of those countries experienced violent political protests in 2011.

“The failure by governments in the region to ensure their citizens’ food security during the 2010 price spike undermined any residual legitimacy of regimes rife with corruption and unable to effectively address poverty and unemployment,” Nick Mabey and his co-authors write in [Underpinning the MENA Democratic Transition](#).

Reducing the Vulnerability of New Democracies

Climate change not only contributed to the timing of the Arab Spring, argue Mabey et al., but it may also impede the spread of democracy moving forward.

While international attention has been focused on building democratic institutions, stabilizing living standards should be a higher priority, they write. New democracies are especially vulnerable to economic shocks, and, as demonstrated by the events of 2010 and 2011, livelihoods in Middle East and North Africa are uniquely affected by climate change and food price spikes. Investments in energy, water and food security therefore have the potential to have outsized effects on living standards and in turn the chances of democracy surviving, they argue.

Why is the region so vulnerable? Because in addition to the environmental challenges already present, especially drastic changes in resource availability are projected for the near future:

„Tunisia, for example, will see a decrease in available drinking water of 30 percent by 2030; increases in the likelihood of crop season failure of over 50 percent by 2050; and over five percent of its population would be impacted by a one meter sea level rise. Egypt’s concentration of industry and population in the Nile Delta makes it the third most vulnerable developing country in the world to sea level rise. There are also potential risks from international disputes over the Nile Basin management as water flows become more volatile and upstream countries drier due to climate change. Modelling suggests that major import crops like wheat are likely to increase in price by up to 80 percent by 2030 due to growing global demand; climate change could increase prices by a further 40 percent.”

To support democracy, Mabey et al. write, “development strategies in the region need to focus more strongly on building economic and social resilience alongside broader-based economic growth.”

This article was originally published on New Security Beat. Please read the full-length version [here](#).



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Playing with Fire? “Backdraft” Report and the Peace and Conflict Potential of Climate Policies

by Stephan Wolters and Dennis Taenzler, adelphi

Not only can activities for climate change mitigation and lowering vulnerability to climate change be seen as suitable approaches to avoid conflict, what has been ignored is the fact that these efforts could also aggravate existing conflicts or create new ones if not carefully designed.

To fill this gap, the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program released a study entitled **Backdraft: The Conflict Potential of Climate Mitigation and Adaptation**. The report comprises two policy reviews and a number of case studies and “spotlights” and was **recently launched in Washington, D.C.**

Three key insights emerge from the report to inform policy decisions on climate change:


- **Do no harm:** Recognize that all interventions have the potential to exacerbate or alleviate existing tensions.
- **Be open to new ideas:** Improve communication and collaboration across communities and disciplines, from climate science and natural resource management experts to international development entities and the military. Intelligent adaptation and mitigation policies need flexible programmes that measure their success against multiple objectives, not just one target.
- **Build pathways to peace:** Identify and implement climate change programmes that can support peace-building initiatives.

The essay, “**The Need for Conflict-Sensitive Adaptation to Climate Change**,” discusses peace and conflict potential against the backdrop of the international climate negotiations. It urges policymakers to think beyond national borders in order to more effectively address the transboundary impacts of climate change in conflict settings. A series of policy recommendations provide the aid and development communities with a potential blueprint for conflict-sensitive adaptation measures.

The case studies and spotlights look at the geopolitical risks of “green” technology, **REDD programs (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation)**, and geoengineering, as well as at civil tensions and stresses created when foreign companies buy land or when forest or cropland is claimed for the production of biofuels. **In his case study and in his presentation at the launch**, VanDeveer, associate professor of political science at the University of New Hampshire, analyzes the conflict potential of mining and refining the minerals vital to so many green technologies. He argues that substantial efforts are needed to address underlying and chronic governance deficits, otherwise the transition to a “green” economy will likely only result in a “greening of the [resource] curse”. The term resource curse has been coined for the observed pattern that heavy dependence on national income from natural resource extraction is often associated with low institutional quality.

The Backdraft Report provides yet another perspective to climate change policies. As panelists at the launch event agreed, it adds a new layer of complexity to an arguably already confusing story. But its message is nevertheless indispensable: responses to the effects of climate change can have their own unintended consequences, and policymakers should pay due attention to design policies that take into account these potential effects.

The potential security risks posed by mitigation and adaptation policies and technologies are intriguing and underexplored aspects of climate change responses. The Wilson Center has released a publication that draws on the insights of leading environmental security experts to examine different facets of the **Conflict Potential of Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation**.



Resilience is the Best Defense: Improving Responses to Climate Change and Security in South Asia

Interview with Janani Vivekananda, International Alert

The Environment, Conflict and Cooperation (ECC) team talked to Janani Vivekananda from the peacebuilding organisation International Alert about climate change and community resilience in South Asia. She is co-author of a recently published study series [Strengthening Responses to Climate Variability in South Asia](#) with case studies of communities across Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan.



Photo by Wilson Center

ECC: Janani, what are the root causes of vulnerability and non-adaptation to current and future climate impacts on security in South Asia, according to your research?

Our research looked at diverse contexts across four different countries in an attempt to understand the unique contextual nuances which underlie vulnerability and obstruct resilience to climate related risks to community security. Whilst experiences varied across each context, five common themes emerged across the four case studies:

1. The need for strong, accountable and participatory local governance
2. Equitable management of and access to natural resources
3. Climate-sensitive alternative livelihoods
4. Fair access to credit; and
5. Peaceful and safe management of migration

Whilst some of the themes may not traditionally fall under current interpretations of climate change adaptation or resilience building, our findings highlight their importance to building resilience to climate variability. In the majority of cases studied, the reason why certain groups within society were particularly vulnerable to potential climate-related risks related to structural socio-political, cultural and economic factors such as poverty, being part of a particular

cultural group or having a certain political affiliation. For example, in India, traditional fishermen were experiencing increased livelihood insecurity partly as a result of encroachment on their fishing waters by wealthier and politically connected shrimp farmers. To understand these dynamics, climate change vulnerability assessments need to understand the power dynamics and the politics of a given context.

ECC: Could you briefly explain the concept of local resilience and why you have chosen to take it as a starting point of your research?

The challenge of responding to climate change and variability is about building resilience, not simply to specific climate and environmental hazards in isolation, but in those complex systems upon which people depend every day. Whilst these systems are affected by international issues



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such as global food prices, or national dynamics such as elections, it is local level factors which determine the coping capacity of a society. These are factors such as whether a particular community is ethnically diverse or homogenous, predominantly agrarian or has equitable access to water resources. It is this level of granularity that is required to understand how to strengthen responses to climate varia-

bility. This is especially the case in fragile states, where more than ever it is critical to ensure context sensitivity and that adaptation responses do no harm. This is why we felt it is important take local empirical realities as a starting point to understand the complexities of building resilience.

To capture some of the different perspectives around local resilience, our methodological approach includes perceptual and anecdotal information from local respondents to supplement scientific data. This is important because in reality, perceptions of risk, resilience and obstacles to resilience are just as relevant to understand as the reality. This is especially pertinent in fragile and post-conflict contexts with a lack of social cohesion or mistrust between a community and governance providers.

ECC: What opportunities have you identified for strengthening resilience to combined risks of climate change and conflict? Could you give specific examples from your research?

Our findings show that resilience against one thing strengthens the capacity of individuals and communities to deal with other risks. If a community is resilient against the impact of climate change, then it is also likely to be resilient to the risk of conflict, the risk of economic shocks or poverty.

Given the limited data on specific short and medium-term climate impacts at the sub-national level, the challenge for actors seeking to strengthen responses to climate change and variability is to be able to better cope with the uncertainty and flux. This entails understanding the consequences of the consequence of climate change. It also entails ensuring that adaptation responses are conflict sensitive. For example, in Sathkira, Bangladesh, increased seasonal migration by men from vulnerable rural regions to urban hubs is a key way the community copes with unviable livelihoods from fishing.

According to our research, this trend is likely to continue, but can lead to tensions between migrants and host communities. Ensuring safe migration for seasonal migrants through better planning and management and integration of migration into development and climate change adaptation strategies is thus vital for building long-term resilience to climate change. This means recognizing both the risks and benefits inherent in migration. And importantly, it also

means not viewing migration in purely numerical terms and as a “problem”, but as a complex and nuanced phenomenon, which if managed in a conflict sensitive manner, can be part of a solution to building resilient communities.

Another priority area for promoting resilience to the linked risks of climate change and conflict across all four studies is effective and equitable governance. Communities dependent on Chilika Lake, India, for example highlighted the need for more effective governance of the lake’s resources. They stressed the need for a comprehensive lake management policy and more participatory decision making processes for effective management and equitable distribution of the lake’s resources. Similarly, in Nepal, it was evident that resilience to climate change and conflict is highly dependent on local governance and power dynamics

“It is local level factors which determine the coping capacity of a society. This is especially the case in fragile states, where more than ever it is critical to ensure context sensitivity and that adaptation responses do no harm.”

over natural resource access. Yet most policies and activities are prioritized from the capital, Kathmandu. Strengthened connections between central government and district administrations would enable greater awareness of local contexts and thus better implementation of national plans at the district level. This would mean that national adaptation processes could be more locally embedded, distribution of funds on the ground would be more conflict sensitive and overall, their risk of inadvertently doing harm to fragile local security dynamics would be reduced.

These examples are of course very context specific, but that is the nature of the issue. Successful and sustainable resilience building depends on understanding the local contexts, including local-level experiences of climate change, whilst also taking into account existing peace and security challenges. The peaceful management of these complex interactions depends on the actions and capacities of local government and public service institutions to cope with the root causes of vulnerability.

ECC: Thank you very much for this interview.

Upcoming Events

Singapore (19 August 2013)

Seminar on “China, Corporate Responsibility and the Politics of Hydropower Development: Assessing Transnational Activism in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar”

This **seminar** at the Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies in Singapore will explore the influence of China's active engagement in South East Asia and the environmental challenges that come with it. The event emphasizes the importance of civil society participation, including both local and international actors. Case studies of protests against hydropower projects in Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar will be analyzed.

Nairobi, Kenya (20-21 August 2013)

The First Africa Food Security Conference

Climate change and a growing population pose great challenges to food security in Africa, as illustrated strikingly by recent crises in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. UNEP and FAO with further partners organize the **First Africa Food Security Conference** in Nairobi, Kenya, to explore how to improve food security by adapting to environmental change and using ecosystem-based approaches. Participants will be able to exchange knowledge and network during alternating plenary and panel phases.

Call for Papers (27 September 2013)

Nexus 2014: Water, Food, Climate and Energy Conference

This call for papers for the **Nexus Conference 2014** organized by the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in collaboration with further institutions is open until 27 September. At the conference, researchers and practitioners from different spheres will have the opportunity to exchange experiences, to discuss current issues concerning the nexus approach and to network. Economic and political facets of the topic, questions of resilience and resource management as well as remote sensing are possible **submission** themes.



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Publications and Resources

Natural Riches? Perspectives on Responsible Natural Resource Management in Conflict-Affected Countries



The World Economic Forum has published a new **study** on responsible natural resources management in a world increasingly in need of raw materials. It is widely known that resource wealth can be both beneficial and have extremely negative impacts on societies, depending on how the resources are used. Despite the fact that this problem concerns many countries, solutions need to be case-specific, as emphasized by the report. Important issues like adequate institution building, community participation and human rights are all aspects of the complex task to use natural resources as a stepping stone towards equilibrated development.

Publications and Resources

Stimson Center 2013 Environment and Security Discussion Series



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For the [2013 Environment and Security Discussion Series](#), the Stimson Center invites experts to share their opinions on how environmental issues affect security policy trends on both national and international levels. During the kick-off event on 22 April 2013, CNA's Senior Vice President Sherri Goodman and the Director of the

[Southeast Asia Program](#) at Stimson, Richard Cronin named several pressing security challenges brought about by climate change, the water-energy-food nexus and the need for sustainable development in strategically significant regions. Please watch the discussion [here](#). International conflicts linked to natural resource usage and demand were the topic of the second event on 11 June with Jeff Colgan, an oil geopolitics expert from American University's School of International Service, and with the Director of Stimson's [Environmental Security Program](#), David Michel. The video is also [available](#).

Agreement on New EU Transparency Requirements



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The [EU's Accounting and Transparency Directives](#) will be revised in order to set stricter disclosure standards for extractive and logging industries as advocated by the [Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative \(EITI\)](#). On 9 April 2013, the Parliament and the Council reached an agreement upon the [Commission's proposal](#) submitted in October 2011. Once the changes are approved and adopted


by the member states, companies will have to disclose all payments to public authorities in countries where they exploit resources with a value above 100 000 euros. Thus, the European regulations will be comparable to those introduced by the US-American [Dodd-Frank Act](#), effective since November 2012. According to [Global Witness](#), companies required to comply with these rules in the USA and EU account for about 70 percent of the sector's stock exchange value. For more details on the legislation process, please consult the [website](#) of the European Commission.

Documentary "Tar Sands – to the Ends of the Earth"



The documentary [Tar Sands - to the Ends of the Earth](#), with a recent screening at the European Parliament in Strasbourg, France, draws attention to the significantly worse CO2 footprint of tar sand mining activities when compared to other fossil fuels and the heavy impact on people's livelihoods in Canada, one of the main producers. The filmmakers also follow Madagascan activists who oppose [tar sands development in their country](#) and [offer insights into the policy processes](#) around the EU's future [Fuel Quality Directive](#) amendment, possibly leading to a tar sands oil ban in the EU.

Preliminary Results of the ASP's "Global Security and Defense Index on Climate Change"



The [American Security Project \(ASP\)](#) envisages an interactive tool, The Global Security and Defense Index on Climate Change, that will allow users to explore how governments around the world view climate security based on the respective comprehensive study. For now, [preliminary results](#) of this research have been presented in a paper by Andrew Holland and Xander Vagg, indicating that about 70 percent of states consider climate change a relevant security issue, while some view it purely as an environmental challenge (about 20 percent).

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